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DRAFT	  4/30/17	  
BE	  CAREFUL	  WHAT	  YOU	  WISH	  FOR?	  
REDUCING	  INEQUALITY	  IN	  THE	  21ST	  CENTURY	  
A	  REVIEW	  OF	  WALTER	  SCHEIDEL,	  “THE	  GREAT	  LEVELER:	  VIOLENCE	  AND	  THE	  HISTORY	  OF	  INEQUALITY	  
FROM	  THE	  STONE	  AGE	  TO	  THE	  TWENTY-­‐FIRST	  CENTURY”	  (Princeton	  Univ.	  Press,	  2017)	  
Reuven	  S.	  Avi-­‐Yonah1	  
Orli	  K.	  Avi-­‐Yonah2	  	  
1. Introduction:	  Inequality	  and	  the	  Great	  Recession	  of	  2008	  
	  
In	  2014,	  a	  surprising	  best-­‐seller	  swept	  the	  United	  States.	  Capital	  in	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  by	  
the	  French	  economist	  Thomas	  Piketty	  was	  published	  in	  English	  translation	  in	  April	  2014.3	  By	  May	  
18,	  the	  English	  edition	  reached	  number	  one	  on	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  list	  for	  hardcover	  nonfiction	  
and	  became	  the	  greatest	  sales	  success	  ever	  of	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  As	  of	  January	  2015,	  the	  
book	  had	  sold	  1.5	  million	  copies	  in	  French,	  English,	  German,	  Chinese	  and	  Spanish.	  
	  
The	  success	  of	  Piketty’s	  book	  stemmed	  from	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Great	  Recession	  of	  2008-­‐
2009.	  The	  recession	  focused	  attention	  to	  the	  increasing	  inequality	  in	  the	  U.S.	  since	  the	  early	  
1970s.	  The	  “Occupy	  Wall	  Street”	  movement,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Tea	  Party,	  were	  both	  responses	  to	  
the	  realization	  that	  while	  the	  recession	  was	  over	  by	  2009,	  over	  95%	  of	  the	  subsequent	  growth	  in	  
the	  US	  economy	  inured	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  top	  1%	  of	  the	  income	  distribution.4	  
	  	  
Piketty	  explained	  this	  phenomenon	  in	  detail.	  Moreover,	  he	  posited	  that	  it	  was	  a	  historical	  
constant:	  The	  main	  driver	  of	  inequality,	  he	  argued,	  was	  the	  tendency	  of	  returns	  on	  capital	  to	  
exceed	  the	  rate	  of	  economic	  growth	  (r>g).	  “In	  slowly	  growing	  economies,	  past	  wealth	  naturally	  
takes	  on	  disproportionate	  importance,	  because	  it	  takes	  only	  a	  small	  flow	  of	  new	  savings	  to	  
increase	  the	  stock	  of	  wealth	  steadily	  and	  substantially.	  If,	  moreover,	  the	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  capital	  
remains	  significantly	  above	  the	  growth	  rate	  for	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time…then	  the	  risk	  of	  
divergence	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  is	  very	  high.”5	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  Cohn	  Professor	  of	  Law,	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  Clinical	  Psychologist	  (Ph.D.,	  Boston	  University,	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  and	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  the	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  Thomas	  Piketty,	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  in	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  translated	  by	  Arthur	  Goldhammer,	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  University	  Press,	  
2014.	  
4	  Saez,	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  and	  Policy	  Implications	  (January	  2017).	  Contemporary	  
Economic	  Policy,	  Vol.	  35,	  Issue	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  Available	  at	  SSRN:	  https://ssrn.com/abstract=2873965	  or	  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/coep.12210.	  
5	  Piketty,	  25.	  
1
Avi-Yonah and Avi-Yonah:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2017
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2958401 
Moreover,	  Piketty	  did	  not	  just	  pose	  the	  problem:	  He	  proposed	  a	  solution.	  In	  the	  last	  part	  of	  the	  
book,	  Piketty	  advocated	  several	  steps	  to	  remedy	  inequality	  by	  regulating	  capital:	  Strengthening	  
the	  welfare	  state,	  dramatically	  increasing	  income	  tax	  rates	  on	  the	  rich,	  and	  imposing	  a	  new	  
global	  tax	  on	  capital.6	  While	  none	  of	  these	  steps	  were	  taken,	  several	  of	  them	  were	  influential	  in	  
shaping	  the	  Democratic	  platform	  for	  the	  2016	  presidential	  campaign,	  especially	  through	  the	  
impact	  of	  Sen.	  Bernie	  Sanders	  (I-­‐VT).7	  	  
	  
But,	  of	  course,	  the	  Democrats	  lost.	  The	  Republicans	  took	  the	  White	  House	  and	  kept	  both	  houses	  
of	  Congress,	  and	  immediately	  proceeded	  to	  propose	  policies	  that	  went	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction	  
of	  Piketty’s	  proposals:	  First,	  abolishing	  the	  tax	  increases	  on	  wealthy	  Americans	  that	  helped	  fund	  
the	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  (ACA);	  Second,	  rolling	  back	  the	  welfare	  state,	  as	  embodied	  in	  the	  ACA,	  
and	  especially	  converting	  Medicaid	  from	  an	  entitlement	  to	  a	  capped	  program;	  and	  third,	  
proposing	  an	  extremely	  regressive	  tax	  reform,	  including	  cutting	  the	  top	  marginal	  individual	  and	  
corporate	  rates,	  abolishing	  the	  estate	  tax,	  and	  converting	  the	  corporate	  tax	  (which	  falls	  primarily	  
on	  capital)	  to	  a	  consumption	  tax	  (that	  falls	  primarily	  on	  consumers).8	  	  
	  
In	  this	  environment,	  a	  new	  book	  appeared.	  Stanford	  historian	  Walter	  Scheidel’s	  The	  Great	  
Leveler:	  Violence	  and	  the	  History	  of	  Inequality	  from	  the	  Stone	  Age	  to	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century	  
(Princeton	  Univ.	  Press,	  2017),	  is,	  in	  some	  respects,	  the	  anti-­‐Piketty.	  Scheidel	  accepts	  Piketty’s	  
view	  that	  inequality	  tends	  to	  grow	  over	  time,	  but	  adds	  a	  crucial	  caveat	  than	  runs	  directly	  
opposite	  to	  Piketty’s	  optimistic	  proposals.	  Scheidel	  argues	  that	  the	  historical	  record	  
demonstrates	  that	  inequality	  can	  only	  be	  reduced	  by	  violent	  means.9	  Therefore,	  the	  Piketty	  
proposals	  to	  reduce	  inequality	  peacefully	  are	  unrealistic,	  and	  Scheidel	  concludes	  his	  book	  by	  
arguing	  that	  we	  should	  accept	  inequality	  as	  the	  price	  of	  peace:	  “All	  of	  us	  who	  prize	  greater	  
economic	  equality	  would	  do	  well	  to	  remember	  that	  with	  the	  rarest	  of	  exceptions,	  it	  was	  only	  
ever	  brought	  forth	  in	  sorrow.	  Be	  careful	  what	  you	  wish	  for.”10	  	  	  	  
	  
This	  review	  will	  first	  summarize	  Scheidel’s	  thesis	  and	  the	  evidence	  for	  it	  (part	  2).	  It	  will	  then	  
argue	  that	  the	  twentieth	  century	  history	  of	  the	  United	  States	  shows	  that	  in	  fact	  inequality	  can	  be	  
reduced	  by	  peaceful	  means,	  even	  though	  such	  reductions	  are	  not	  easy	  to	  achieve	  and	  usually	  
require	  bipartisan	  consensus	  (part	  3).	  Next,	  the	  review	  will	  address	  why	  the	  Great	  Recession	  of	  
2008-­‐9	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  inequality,	  unlike	  the	  Great	  Depression	  (Part	  4).	  Finally,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Piketty,	  471-­‐540.	  
7	  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/117717.pdf.	  
8	  https://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-­‐Tax-­‐PolicyPaper.pdf.	  For	  a	  critique,	  see	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  
Reuven	  S.	  and	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  Kimberly	  A.,	  Problems	  with	  Destination-­‐Based	  Corporate	  Taxes	  and	  the	  Ryan	  Blueprint	  
(February	  5,	  2017).	  U	  of	  Michigan	  Law	  &	  Econ	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  16-­‐029.	  Available	  at	  SSRN:	  
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2884903.	  
9	  Scheidel,	  51:	  “But	  were	  there	  also	  other,	  more	  peaceful	  means	  of	  lowering	  inequality?	  If	  we	  think	  of	  leveling	  on	  a	  
large	  scale,	  the	  answer	  must	  be	  no.	  Across	  the	  full	  sweep	  of	  history,	  every	  single	  one	  of	  the	  major	  compressions	  of	  
material	  inequality	  we	  can	  observe	  in	  the	  record	  was	  driven	  by	  one	  or	  more	  of	  these	  four	  levelers.”	  (Emphasis	  
added).	  
10	  Scheidel,	  444.	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review	  will	  ask	  what	  can	  be	  done,	  and	  propose	  certain	  steps	  that	  may	  be	  more	  achievable	  than	  
Piketty’s	  proposals	  (part	  5).	  
	  
2. The	  Scheidel	  Thesis	  
	  
Scheidel	  summarizes	  his	  thesis	  as	  follows:	  
	  
For	  thousands	  of	  years,	  civilization	  did	  not	  lend	  itself	  to	  peaceful	  equalization.	  Across	  a	  
wide	  range	  of	  societies	  and	  different	  levels	  of	  development,	  stability	  favored	  economic	  
inequality.	  This	  was	  as	  true	  of	  Pharaonic	  Egypt	  as	  it	  was	  of	  Victorian	  England,	  as	  true	  of	  
the	  Roman	  Empire	  as	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  Violent	  shocks	  were	  of	  paramount	  
importance	  in	  disrupting	  the	  established	  order,	  in	  compressing	  the	  distribution	  of	  
income	  and	  wealth,	  in	  narrowing	  the	  gap	  between	  rich	  and	  poor.	  Throughout	  recorded	  
history,	  the	  most	  powerful	  leveling	  invariably	  resulted	  from	  the	  most	  powerful	  shocks.	  
Four	  different	  kinds	  of	  violent	  ruptures	  have	  flattened	  inequality:	  mass	  mobilization	  
warfare,	  transformative	  revolution,	  state	  failure,	  and	  lethal	  pandemics.11	  
The	  rest	  of	  the	  book	  marshals	  powerful	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  this	  thesis.	  First,	  Scheidel	  shows	  
convincingly	  (and	  consistently	  with	  Piketty,	  but	  with	  data	  stretching	  much	  father	  back	  in	  history)	  
that	  in	  peaceful	  times,	  inequality	  tends	  to	  grow.	  For	  example,	  historical	  data	  enable	  Scheidel	  to	  
show	  that	  inequality	  in	  Europe	  grew	  from	  pre-­‐historic	  times	  to	  reach	  a	  peak	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  
Roman	  Empire	  (around	  200	  CE),	  declined	  with	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  empire,	  rose	  again	  gradually	  
from	  650	  CE	  to	  the	  Black	  Death	  (1350	  CE),	  declined	  sharply	  and	  then	  began	  rising	  again	  until	  the	  
outbreak	  of	  WWI	  in	  1914,	  then	  declined	  in	  the	  “Great	  Compression”	  of	  1914-­‐1975	  and	  began	  
rising	  again	  from	  1975	  on.12	  	  
Similar	  trends	  are	  visible	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  Gini	  coefficient,	  which	  Scheidel	  uses	  as	  his	  
main	  measure	  of	  inequality,	  rose	  from	  0.44	  in	  1774	  to	  0.49	  in	  1850	  to	  0.51	  in	  1860,	  and	  the	  
share	  of	  national	  income	  earned	  by	  the	  top	  1%	  of	  the	  income	  distribution	  rose	  from	  8.5%	  in	  
1774	  to	  9.2%	  in	  1850	  to	  10%	  in	  1860.13	  The	  Civil	  War	  reduced	  inequality	  in	  the	  South	  but	  
increased	  it	  in	  the	  North:	  The	  top	  1%	  income	  share	  reached	  18%	  in	  1913,	  and	  the	  share	  of	  all	  
assets	  held	  by	  the	  richest	  1%	  of	  US	  households	  rose	  from	  25%	  to	  46%	  between	  1810	  and	  1910.14	  
In	  the	  long	  run,	  inequality	  in	  the	  US	  increased	  steadily	  from	  1650	  to	  WWI,	  with	  only	  a	  small	  
reduction	  during	  the	  American	  Revolution	  and	  none	  during	  the	  Civil	  War.	  From	  WWI	  to	  1970,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Scheidel,	  6	  (emphasis	  added).	  	  
12	  Scheidel,	  Figure	  3.1.	  
13	  Scheidel,	  333.	  The	  Gini	  coefficient	  equals	  1	  when	  a	  single	  individual	  controls	  all	  resources	  and	  0	  when	  all	  
individuals	  control	  equal	  resources.	  Scheidel	  recognizes	  that	  there	  may	  be	  better	  measures	  of	  inequality,	  but	  the	  
Gini	  is	  the	  only	  one	  that	  can	  be	  measured	  across	  history,	  with	  better	  data	  for	  more	  recent	  periods.	  Scheidel	  does	  a	  
great	  job	  in	  obtaining	  the	  best	  measures	  across	  time	  given	  the	  limitations	  of	  available	  data.	  The	  breadth	  of	  his	  
expertise	  is	  astonishing.	  
14	  Scheidel,	  333-­‐334.	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however,	  inequality	  dropped	  sharply,	  rising	  thereafter	  but	  still	  not	  reaching	  the	  height	  of	  the	  
first	  “gilded	  age.”15	  
Second,	  Scheidel	  shows	  convincingly	  that	  most	  reductions	  of	  inequality	  were	  indeed	  the	  result	  
of	  his	  “four	  horsemen”:	  mass	  mobilization	  war,	  transformative	  revolution,	  state	  collapse	  and	  
pandemics.	  The	  effects	  of	  the	  two	  world	  wars	  in	  Europe	  illustrate	  the	  first,	  the	  Russian	  and	  
Chinese	  revolutions	  the	  second,	  contemporary	  Somalia	  and	  Libya	  the	  third,	  and	  the	  Black	  Death	  
the	  fourth.16	  	  	  
But	  Scheidel’s	  hypothesis	  is	  stronger	  than	  this:	  He	  argues	  that	  reductions	  of	  inequality	  
“invariably”	  resulted	  from	  the	  four	  horsemen	  (“every	  single	  one	  of	  the	  major	  compressions	  of	  
material	  inequality	  we	  can	  observe	  in	  the	  record	  was	  driven	  by	  one	  or	  more	  of	  these	  four	  
levelers.”)17	  We	  believe	  that	  this	  way	  of	  stating	  the	  Scheidel	  thesis	  is	  too	  strong,	  and	  that	  the	  
history	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  provides	  a	  counter-­‐example.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  
suggests	  that	  it	  is	  possible,	  albeit	  not	  easy,	  to	  reduce	  inequality	  by	  peaceful	  means.	  
3. A	  Counter-­‐Example:	  The	  Great	  Depression	  and	  its	  Consequences,	  1929-­‐1973	  
	  
In	  Figure	  5.1,	  Scheidel	  shows	  the	  top	  1%	  income	  shares	  in	  the	  US,	  France,	  Canada	  and	  Japan	  
from	  1935	  to	  1975.	  They	  all	  show	  the	  same	  pattern:	  A	  sharp	  decline	  from	  the	  late	  1930s	  to	  
1945,	  then	  a	  much	  more	  gradual	  decline	  until	  1975.	  The	  sharpest	  fall	  is	  in	  Japan,	  but	  the	  others	  
are	  not	  far	  behind.	  	  
	  
Scheidel’s	  argument	  is	  that	  this	  decline	  is	  the	  result	  of	  World	  War	  II	  and	  its	  after-­‐effects.	  But	  this	  
presents	  a	  puzzle.	  How	  can	  France	  and	  Japan,	  which	  suffered	  devastating	  destruction	  in	  the	  
Word	  War,	  show	  the	  same	  pattern	  as	  the	  US	  and	  Canada,	  which	  did	  not?	  Moreover,	  the	  decline	  
in	  the	  US	  begins	  in	  1936,	  which	  was	  five	  years	  before	  the	  US	  entered	  the	  war.	  
	  
In	  addition,	  Scheidel’s	  Figure	  5.5,	  which	  shows	  capital	  income	  share	  in	  total	  gross	  income	  for	  the	  
top	  1%	  in	  France,	  Sweden	  and	  the	  US	  from	  1920	  to	  2010,	  shows	  a	  gradual	  decline	  in	  Sweden,	  a	  
very	  sharp	  drop	  in	  France	  during	  WWII,	  and	  a	  less	  sharp	  drop	  followed	  by	  a	  swift	  recovery	  and	  
then	  gradual	  decline	  in	  the	  US.	  	  This	  pattern	  does	  suggest	  that	  violence	  had	  the	  expected	  impact	  
in	  France,	  but	  it	  also	  indicates	  that	  countries	  that	  were	  not	  directly	  impacted	  by	  WWII	  (Sweden)	  
or	  were	  involved	  but	  were	  not	  invaded	  (the	  US)	  reduced	  inequality	  by	  other	  means.	  
	  
In	  general,	  Scheidel’s	  claim	  that	  all	  of	  the	  “Great	  Compression”	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  
the	  two	  World	  Wars	  and	  therefore	  to	  “mass	  mobilization	  warfare”	  seems	  overly	  -­‐broad.	  In	  the	  
US,	  WWI	  did	  indeed	  cause	  a	  sharp	  rise	  in	  income	  tax	  rates	  on	  the	  rich,	  and	  therefore	  can	  be	  said	  
to	  have	  directly	  contributed	  to	  the	  decline	  in	  inequality	  during	  the	  war	  years.	  But	  income	  tax	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Scheidel,	  337,	  Figure	  3.5.	  
16	  Scheidel,	  ch.	  4-­‐5,	  6,	  10.	  
17	  Scheidel	  6,	  51	  (emphasis	  added).	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rates	  were	  cut	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  war,	  and	  the	  1920s	  in	  general	  saw	  a	  rise	  in	  inequality,	  
which	  reached	  its	  all-­‐time	  peak	  in	  the	  US	  in	  1929.18	  
	  
The	  reduction	  in	  inequality	  from	  1936	  on	  was	  not	  the	  result	  of	  war.	  It	  was	  the	  direct	  result	  of	  
the	  Great	  Depression	  and	  the	  election	  of	  Franklin	  Delano	  Roosevelt	  in	  1932.	  After	  his	  election,	  
FDR	  proceeded	  with	  the	  large	  Democratic	  majorities	  in	  Congress	  (and	  with	  significant	  
Republican	  support)	  to	  enact	  policies	  that	  created	  the	  American	  welfare	  state	  (Social	  Security,	  
1935),	  strengthened	  the	  labor	  movement	  (National	  Industrial	  Recovery	  Act,	  1933),	  and	  
increased	  progressive	  taxation	  (the	  1936	  tax	  act).19	  None	  of	  these	  steps,	  which	  contributed	  to	  
the	  reduction	  of	  inequality	  in	  the	  pre-­‐WWII	  years,	  were	  the	  result	  of	  war	  or	  violence.	  	  
	  
While	  the	  WWII	  years	  further	  reduced	  inequality	  in	  the	  US,	  much	  of	  the	  constraints	  imposed	  by	  
the	  government,	  such	  as	  the	  “mass	  tax”	  (extending	  the	  income	  tax	  to	  the	  middle	  class)	  and	  
wage	  controls,	  impacted	  the	  middle	  class	  more	  than	  the	  rich.	  Moreover,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  was	  
not	  followed	  by	  a	  cut	  in	  taxes	  as	  in	  the	  1920s.	  Progressive	  tax	  rates	  on	  the	  rich	  remained	  very	  
high	  (over	  90%)	  throughout	  the	  period	  1945-­‐1960,	  and	  the	  top	  marginal	  tax	  rate	  when	  Ronald	  
Reagan	  was	  elected	  was	  still	  quite	  high	  (70%).20	  	  Moreover,	  the	  1960s	  saw	  a	  massive	  expansion	  
of	  the	  welfare	  state	  with	  the	  enactment	  of	  LBJ’s	  “War	  on	  Poverty”	  program,	  including	  Medicaid	  
and	  Medicare.21	  None	  of	  these	  developments	  can	  plausibly	  be	  attributed	  to	  World	  War	  II,	  which	  
ended	  twenty	  years	  earlier.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  thus	  hard	  to	  agree	  with	  Scheidel	  that	  the	  reduction	  of	  inequality	  in	  the	  US	  in	  the	  twentieth	  
century	  was	  primarily	  the	  result	  of	  violence.	  It	  was,	  instead,	  the	  result	  of	  a	  peaceful	  political	  
reaction	  to	  the	  Great	  Depression,	  which	  led	  FDR	  to	  propose	  programs	  to	  create	  a	  social	  safety	  
net.	  The	  fear	  of	  the	  Russian	  Revolution	  was	  indeed	  an	  inspiration	  to	  reform	  in	  the	  US,	  but	  fear	  of	  
revolution	  is	  not	  revolution.22	  	  
	  
Scheidel	  acknowledges	  the	  leveling	  effect	  on	  the	  Great	  Depression:	  “The	  Great	  Depression	  was	  
the	  only	  macroeconomic	  crisis	  that	  had	  a	  powerful	  impact	  on	  economic	  inequality	  in	  the	  United	  
States,”	  noting	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  wealth	  share	  of	  the	  richest	  1%	  from	  51.4%	  to	  47%	  between	  
1928	  and	  1932,	  and	  of	  their	  income	  share	  from	  23.9%	  to	  15.5%	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  But	  he	  
argues	  that	  “income	  concentration	  held	  steady	  until	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  war”23	  and	  concludes	  
that	  without	  the	  war	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  Depression	  would	  have	  leveled	  off.	  This	  may	  or	  may	  not	  
be	  true,	  but	  Figure	  5.1	  indicates	  that	  the	  long	  decline	  (to	  1973)	  in	  the	  top	  1%	  share	  of	  income	  in	  
the	  US	  began	  well	  before	  the	  war.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Scheidel,	  337;	  Saez,	  supra.	  
19	  Ira	  Katznelson,	  Fear	  Itself:	  The	  New	  Deal	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  Our	  Time	  (Norton,	  2013).	  
20	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Reuven	  S.,	  Why	  Tax	  the	  Rich:	  Efficiency,	  Equity,	  and	  Progressive	  Taxation.	  111	  Yale	  Law	  Journal	  1391	  
(2002).	  	  
21	  Annelise	  Orleck	  and	  Lisa	  Hazirjian	  (Eds.),The	  War	  on	  Poverty:	  A	  New	  Grassroots	  History,	  1964-­‐1980	  (2011).	  
22	  Katznelson,	  supra.	  
23	  Scheidel,	  1040.	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Thus,	  we	  believe	  that	  while	  Scheidel	  is	  correct	  in	  that	  most	  dramatic	  reductions	  in	  inequality	  
throughout	  history	  have	  been	  the	  result	  of	  violence,	  there	  is	  at	  least	  one	  counter-­‐example	  to	  his	  
claim.	  This	  counter-­‐example	  shows	  that	  under	  the	  right	  political	  conditions,	  inequality	  can	  be	  
reduced	  by	  peaceful	  means.	  Both	  FDR	  and	  LBJ	  were	  able	  to	  enact	  inequality-­‐reducing	  measures	  
peacefully.	  But	  this	  observation	  leads	  to	  the	  obvious	  question:	  Why	  did	  the	  Great	  Recession	  of	  
2008-­‐9	  not	  lead	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  inequality?	  	  
	  
4. Why	  did	  the	  Great	  Recession	  not	  Lead	  to	  Reduced	  Inequality?	  
	  
The	  Great	  Recession	  of	  2008-­‐9	  was	  the	  sharpest	  downturn	  in	  the	  economy	  since	  the	  Great	  
Depression.	  But	  unlike	  the	  Great	  Depression,	  it	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  any	  reduction	  in	  inequality.	  
Neither	  the	  bank	  bailout,	  nor	  the	  Obama	  stimulus,	  nor	  even	  the	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  
affected	  the	  Gini	  coefficient.	  Until	  very	  recently,	  almost	  the	  entire	  growth	  in	  the	  economy	  
inured	  to	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  top	  1%.24	  	  
	  
The	  second	  author	  is	  a	  clinical	  psychologist	  who	  experienced	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Great	  
Recession	  directly	  in	  her	  practice.	  The	  following	  observations	  are	  based	  on	  her	  experience,	  
and	  suggest	  some	  psychological	  reasons	  why	  the	  people	  in	  charge	  of	  national	  policy	  failed	  to	  
enact	  policies	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  peaceful	  reduction	  in	  inequality:	  
	  
“In	  the	  fateful	  days	  after	  the	  demise	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	  in	  September	  2008,	  I	  often	  
wondered	  whether	  the	  people	  setting	  national	  polices	  understood	  the	  impact	  of	  their	  
decisions	  on	  the	  patients	  I	  was	  seeing	  in	  my	  office.	  	  This	  was	  not	  a	  theoretical	  meditation	  on	  
the	  meaning	  of	  life.	  It	  was	  born	  out	  of	  an	  urgency	  to	  support	  people,	  all	  of	  whom	  attempted	  
to	  hold	  on	  to	  the	  American	  dream:	  The	  promise	  that	  if	  you	  work	  hard,	  and	  honestly,	  and	  you	  
give	  it	  your	  all,	  you	  will	  be	  safe.	  But	  safety	  was	  not	  to	  be	  had	  for	  many	  of	  them.	  The	  storm	  
bearing	  bad	  news	  never	  ceased.	  It	  came	  in	  unforgiving	  waves	  of	  destruction.	  The	  people	  
affected	  represented	  the	  entire	  socio-­‐economic	  spectrum.	  	  
	  
For	  a	  long	  while,	  it	  was	  hard	  to	  see	  the	  light	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  tunnel.	  The	  emotions	  that	  
dominated	  people’s	  lives	  were	  fear,	  dismay,	  disbelief,	  horror	  and	  helplessness.	  Let	  me	  be	  
concrete:	  People	  did	  lose	  their	  homes,	  jobs,	  health,	  and	  their	  way	  of	  life.	  Relationships	  and	  
marriages	  faltered,	  social	  relations	  were	  severed,	  and	  shame	  and	  isolation	  reigned	  supreme.	  
These	  were	  not	  reckless	  people	  who	  were	  over-­‐leveraged,	  who	  played	  the	  stock	  market	  like	  
a	  Russian	  roulette.	  By	  and	  large,	  these	  were	  highly	  educated,	  middle	  aged,	  hopeful	  people	  
who	  were	  forced	  to	  pick	  up	  their	  shattered	  lives	  with	  no	  relief	  in	  sight.	  It	  was,	  and	  is,	  a	  
sobering	  time.	  	  For	  some,	  economic	  and	  financial	  recovery	  has	  yet	  to	  happen.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Saez,	  Emmanuel,	  Income	  and	  Wealth	  Inequality:	  Evidence	  and	  Policy	  Implications	  (January	  2017).	  Contemporary	  








To	  be	  clear,	  the	  terror	  of	  the	  impending	  collapse	  of	  the	  auto	  industry	  resonated	  so	  loudly	  
that	  it	  was	  hard	  to	  comprehend	  how	  anybody	  could	  be	  oblivious	  to	  the	  potential	  job	  loss	  of	  
millions	  of	  people.	  One	  question	  that	  repeatedly	  pierced	  my	  consciousness	  was,	  what	  was	  
the	  psychology	  of	  the	  people	  in	  charge,	  who	  led	  us	  into	  this	  calamity,	  and	  of	  those	  who	  
were	  now	  entrusted	  with	  navigating	  us	  out	  of	  this	  storm?	  My	  many	  years	  of	  practice	  in	  
three	  different	  states	  (New	  York,	  Massachusetts	  and	  Michigan)	  offered	  some	  potential	  
hypotheses.	  In	  the	  winter	  of	  2009,	  I	  wrote	  a	  draft	  paper	  under	  the	  title	  “Disorders	  of	  
Extreme	  Privilege”	  (DEP).	  I	  was	  attempting	  to	  illuminate	  and	  understand	  some	  of	  the	  
psychological	  dynamics	  involved	  in	  the	  decision	  making	  of	  people	  who	  hold	  power	  to	  hire	  
and	  fire	  people	  and	  to	  buy	  and	  sell	  companies.	  	  
	  
I	  was	  also	  pondering	  the	  question	  of	  “will	  they	  ever	  learn”	  from	  the	  mistakes	  that	  led	  us	  to	  
the	  crisis	  of	  2008?	  Not	  likely,	  I	  answered.	  There	  are	  too	  few	  examples	  in	  the	  history	  of	  
leaders	  who	  were	  able	  to	  correct	  course	  based	  on	  a	  profound	  realization	  of	  their	  own	  faulty	  
assumptions.25	  I	  turned	  my	  attention	  to	  what	  may	  be	  the	  psychological	  phenomenon	  of	  
inability	  to	  change	  course	  in	  the	  face	  of	  an	  avalanche	  of	  data	  contradicting	  one’s	  
assumptions.26	  	  	  
	  
This	  psychological	  phenomenon	  that	  I	  term	  DEP	  involves	  the	  ability	  to	  isolate	  oneself	  from	  
the	  pain	  of	  others,	  and	  to	  remain	  dispassionate	  and	  at	  times	  oblivious	  to	  the	  real	  life	  
consequences	  of	  “economic	  and	  financial	  decisions,”	  oftentimes	  accompanied	  by	  the	  
euphemism	  of	  “increased	  efficiency”	  and	  “maximizing	  shareholder	  value.”	  People	  who	  
suffer	  from	  this	  level	  of	  isolation	  are	  at	  times	  quite	  fearful	  themselves.	  They	  fear	  the	  loss	  of	  
status,	  of	  material	  possessions,	  and	  of	  power.	  A	  subset	  of	  them,	  who	  ascended	  from	  humble	  
beginnings,	  employ	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  psychological	  mechanism,	  often	  referred	  to	  in	  
the	  literature	  as	  dissociation.	  	  “Forgetting”	  their	  own	  personal	  history	  and	  the	  people	  who	  
share	  their	  early	  histories,	  they	  rather	  nurture	  the	  belief	  that	  their	  ascension	  and	  success	  is	  
due	  purely	  to	  their	  personal	  attributes	  and	  hard	  work,	  which	  is	  a	  conviction	  that	  allows	  
them	  to	  view	  the	  less	  financially	  fortunate	  as	  lacking	  in	  the	  above	  attributes.	  Marinating	  in	  
that	  faulty	  set	  of	  beliefs	  (that	  one’s	  own	  success	  is	  purely	  the	  result	  of	  one’s	  special	  
attributes)	  fosters,	  when	  interacting	  with	  like	  minded	  people,	  a	  sense	  of	  entitlement	  and	  
disdain	  for	  vulnerability	  in	  oneself	  and	  in	  others.	  Distancing	  from	  pain	  becomes	  an	  
imperative	  that	  ensures	  the	  resiliency	  of	  the	  grandiose	  notion	  that	  extreme	  success	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Anwar	  Sadat	  and	  Yitzhak	  Rabin	  are	  two	  recent	  examples.	  
26	  This	  phenomenon	  has	  been	  documented	  in	  the	  psychological	  literature	  for	  decades.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Leon	  Festinger,	  
Henry	  W.	  Riecken	  and	  Stanley	  Schachter,	  When	  Prophecy	  Fails:	  A	  Social	  and	  Psychological	  Study	  of	  a	  Modern	  
Group	  that	  Predicted	  the	  Destruction	  of	  the	  World	  (1956).	  For	  a	  modern	  study	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  power	  
and	  disinhibition	  see	  Dacher	  Keltner,	  Deborah	  H.	  Gruenfeld,	  and	  Cameron	  Anderson,	  Power,	  Approach,	  and	  
Inhibition,	  110	  Psychological	  Review	  265	  (2003).	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accounted	  for	  purely	  by	  one’s	  own	  attributes	  and	  actions,	  denying	  the	  role	  of	  luck	  and	  social	  
conditions	  in	  economic	  success.	  	  
	  
One	  illustration	  would	  be	  the	  tone-­‐deaf	  objection	  to	  the	  auto	  bailout	  in	  2009.	  The	  economic	  
merit	  of	  one	  plan	  or	  another	  notwithstanding,	  when	  millions	  of	  people	  stood	  to	  lose	  
everything	  they	  had	  ever	  worked	  for	  or	  dreamed	  of,	  to	  pronounce	  that	  no	  bailout	  was	  
necessary	  was	  the	  height	  of	  willful	  ignorance,	  and	  a	  complete	  disregard	  for	  the	  voiceless.	  
These	  voiceless	  found	  their	  voices	  in	  the	  next	  decade,	  much	  to	  the	  surprise	  of	  many	  who	  did	  
not	  listen	  or	  chose	  to	  avert	  their	  gaze	  from	  the	  “flyover”	  states.	  Flying	  over	  people’s	  pain	  is	  a	  
perilous	  endeavor,	  I	  have	  learned.	  	  
	  	  	  
One	  field	  of	  inquiry	  that	  might	  assist	  us	  in	  shedding	  light	  on	  the	  current	  psychological,	  social	  
and	  political	  landscape	  would	  be	  the	  study	  of	  interpersonal	  trauma	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  
people’s	  lives.	  Ten	  years	  later,	  the	  economic	  crisis	  can	  be	  conceptualized	  as	  a	  chronic	  
trauma	  in	  one	  segment	  of	  the	  population,	  with	  occasional	  exacerbations;	  in	  other	  words,	  a	  
chronic	  crisis	  with	  occasional	  acute	  crises.	  What	  in	  2008	  was	  an	  acute	  anxiety	  was	  never	  
resolved.	  It	  changed	  from	  acute	  to	  chronic	  anxiety.	  It	  is	  now	  accompanied	  by	  the	  well	  known	  
effects	  of	  chronic	  stress	  on	  people’s	  bodies:	  A	  diminished	  immune	  system,	  depletion	  of	  
hope,	  rising	  chronic	  anger,	  demoralization,	  chronic	  health	  problems	  and	  substance	  abuse,	  
and,	  worst	  of	  all,	  increased	  social	  isolation,	  which	  both	  maintains	  and	  reinforces	  
hopelessness,	  cynicism	  and	  dejection.27	  	  
	  
Some	  people	  were	  able	  to	  recover	  and	  regain	  or	  even	  surpass	  their	  2008	  success.	  But	  the	  
wide	  swath	  of	  people	  who	  lost	  economic	  and	  social	  ground	  remained	  until	  recently	  
stubbornly	  out	  of	  sight	  and	  untouched	  by	  government	  policies.	  Worse,	  many	  people	  were	  
not	  as	  affected	  by	  chronic	  crisis	  and	  were	  able	  to	  go	  on	  with	  their	  lives,	  often	  unaware	  that	  
the	  increased	  anxiety	  about	  their	  vulnerability	  they	  now	  experienced	  has	  transmuted	  into	  a	  
ferocious	  commitment	  to	  holding	  on	  to	  their	  gains,	  so	  that	  they	  do	  not	  end	  up	  like	  the	  
others	  who	  lost.	  	  This	  created	  a	  social	  schism	  characterized	  by	  lack	  of	  compassion	  for	  people	  
who	  were	  different	  and	  vulnerable.	  	  
	  
The	  recent	  election,	  regardless	  of	  one’s	  political	  views,	  represents	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  
pain	  of	  some	  who	  were	  left	  behind	  into	  hopefulness	  that	  something	  not	  only	  should	  but	  can	  
be	  done	  to	  restore	  the	  dignity	  and	  previous	  social	  and	  economic	  standing	  of	  those	  who	  
became	  collateral	  damage	  in	  the	  recent	  wave	  of	  unbridled	  globalization.”	  	  	  
	  
A	  good	  illustration	  of	  the	  political	  manifestations	  of	  DEP	  and	  its	  direct	  relationship	  to	  
inequality	  is	  the	  bipartisan	  saga	  of	  how	  US	  multinationals	  came	  to	  amass	  over	  $2.5	  trillion	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  See	  the	  well-­‐known	  study	  of	  Anne	  Case	  and	  Angus	  Deaton,	  Mortality	  and	  Morbidity	  in	  the	  21st	  Century,	  
Brookings	  Papers	  on	  Economic	  Activity	  (2017),	  documenting	  the	  increased	  morbidity	  and	  mortality	  of	  white	  
working	  class	  Americans.	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profits	  in	  low-­‐taxed	  jurisdictions	  offshore.	  Before	  1997,	  there	  were	  provisions	  in	  the	  US	  tax	  
Code	  that	  were	  enacted	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  that	  limited	  the	  ability	  of	  US-­‐based	  multinationals	  
to	  shift	  profits	  from	  high	  tax	  to	  low	  tax	  foreign	  jurisdictions	  without	  triggering	  US	  tax.	  The	  
underlying	  theory	  of	  those	  provisions	  (“Subpart	  F”)	  was	  that	  the	  corporate	  tax	  is	  an	  
important	  bulwark	  against	  increasing	  inequality,	  since	  its	  incidence	  is	  mostly	  on	  the	  rich,	  and	  
that	  the	  US	  should	  not	  leave	  revenue	  on	  the	  table	  by	  allowing	  US	  multinationals	  to	  escape	  
both	  foreign	  and	  US	  tax.	  US	  multinationals	  were	  allowed	  under	  Subpart	  F	  to	  defer	  tax	  on	  
some	  foreign	  earnings,	  but	  because	  of	  Subpart	  F	  the	  revenue	  cost	  of	  this	  provision	  was	  
relatively	  low	  (below	  $5	  billion	  a	  year).	  	  
	  
In	  1997,	  the	  Clinton	  Treasury	  adopted	  an	  innocuous	  seeming	  provision	  called	  “check	  the	  
box”	  which	  enabled	  US	  multinationals	  to	  choose	  whether	  their	  foreign	  subsidiaries	  would	  be	  
treated	  as	  separate	  subsidiaries	  or	  as	  branches	  for	  US	  tax	  purposes.	  The	  effect,	  which	  was	  
presumably	  foreseen	  by	  the	  drafters	  of	  the	  regulation,	  was	  to	  completely	  undermine	  
Subpart	  F	  and	  enable	  US	  multinationals	  to	  shift	  profits	  from	  high	  to	  low	  tax	  foreign	  
jurisdictions	  without	  triggering	  US	  tax.	  However,	  this	  money	  was	  “trapped”	  offshore,	  since	  if	  
the	  funds	  were	  distributed	  to	  the	  US	  parent,	  this	  would	  trigger	  a	  35%	  US	  tax.	  
	  
By	  2004,	  the	  use	  of	  check	  the	  box	  led	  US	  multinationals	  to	  amass	  over	  $300	  billion	  in	  low-­‐
taxed	  foreign	  profits	  offshore.	  In	  that	  year,	  the	  Republican	  dominated	  Congress	  and	  White	  
House	  passed	  an	  amnesty	  that	  allowed	  them	  multinationals	  to	  repatriate	  those	  funds	  
without	  incurring	  US	  tax.	  This	  law	  was	  called	  the	  “American	  Jobs	  Creation	  Act”	  and	  the	  
nominal	  intent	  was	  to	  encourage	  domestic	  job	  creation,	  but	  subsequent	  investigations	  have	  
shown	  that	  the	  multinationals	  effectively	  used	  the	  funds	  to	  repurchase	  shares	  and	  pay	  
executive	  compensation,	  enriching	  their	  shareholders	  and	  executives,	  while	  laying	  off	  
thousands	  of	  ordinary	  workers.28	  
	  
By	  October	  2006,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  Democrats	  were	  poised	  to	  take	  over	  Congress,	  and	  
that	  “check	  the	  box”	  may	  be	  in	  danger	  as	  a	  mere	  regulation	  of	  being	  overridden	  by	  
legislation.	  Therefore,	  the	  Republican	  dominated	  Congress	  enacted	  Code	  section	  954(c)(6)	  
as	  a	  “temporary”	  measure,	  which	  enshrined	  “check	  the	  box”	  in	  the	  Code.	  The	  Democratic	  
majority	  renewed	  the	  provision	  when	  it	  was	  due	  to	  expire	  in	  2007	  and	  2008.	  
	  
When	  President	  Obama	  took	  office	  in	  January	  2009,	  the	  largest	  international	  tax	  revenue	  
raiser	  in	  his	  first	  budget	  was	  repealing	  both	  “check	  the	  box”	  and	  section	  954(c)(6).	  The	  
Democrats	  had	  large,	  filibuster-­‐proof	  majorities	  in	  Congress	  and	  could	  easily	  have	  passed	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the	  repeal	  in	  2009-­‐2010.	  But	  nothing	  happened,	  and	  by	  November	  2009	  the	  repeal	  measure	  
was	  shelved.	  It	  was	  not	  resurrected	  again	  until	  after	  the	  Republicans	  took	  over	  both	  the	  
House	  and	  the	  Senate	  in	  2014,	  making	  the	  repeal	  proposal	  a	  meaningless	  gesture	  by	  the	  
Obama	  Administration.	  Moreover,	  Congress	  repeatedly	  passed	  and	  President	  Obama	  signed	  
extensions	  of	  section	  954(c)(6),	  most	  recently	  for	  five	  years	  in	  2016.	  
	  
The	  result	  has	  been	  an	  explosion	  in	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  untaxed	  offshore	  profits	  of	  US-­‐based	  
multinationals.	  They	  now	  exceed	  $2.5	  trillion	  (all	  accumulated	  since	  the	  2004-­‐5	  amnesty),	  
and	  the	  choice	  not	  to	  tax	  them	  is	  the	  second	  largest	  tax	  expenditure	  (i.e.,	  a	  subsidy	  
delivered	  through	  the	  tax	  Code,	  or	  corporate	  welfare)	  in	  the	  federal	  budget,	  exceeding	  for	  
example	  the	  home	  mortgage	  interest	  deduction	  and	  the	  exclusion	  of	  earnings	  on	  401(k)	  
accounts.	  Only	  the	  exclusion	  for	  health	  care	  insurance	  is	  more	  expensive.	  
	  
There	  is	  now	  a	  bipartisan	  consensus	  that	  these	  $2.5	  trillion	  should	  be	  taxed	  lightly	  (under	  
the	  House	  GOP	  plan,	  below	  10%)	  and	  then	  allowed	  to	  be	  repatriated	  tax	  free,	  and	  that	  any	  
future	  offshore	  profits	  should	  be	  completely	  exempt	  from	  tax.	  This	  “territoriality”	  proposal	  
was	  supported	  by	  the	  Obama	  Administration,	  by	  the	  Hillary	  Clinton	  campaign,	  and	  by	  both	  
the	  Trump	  Administration	  and	  the	  House	  GOP	  majority.	  	  
	  
5. What	  Can	  be	  Done?	  
	  
Scheidel	  would	  have	  us	  believe	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  seriously	  impact	  inequality	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐
first	  century	  is	  through	  war	  or	  revolution.	  Unfortunately,	  unless	  something	  is	  done	  to	  reduce	  
inequality,	  he	  may	  be	  right.	  
	  
Political	  theorists	  have	  for	  a	  long	  time	  sought	  to	  explain	  the	  causes	  of	  violent	  revolutions.	  In	  
general,	  such	  revolutions	  do	  not	  occur	  when	  the	  majority	  in	  a	  given	  society	  is	  beaten	  down,	  
because	  people	  who	  are	  too	  poor	  to	  obtain	  a	  living	  invest	  all	  their	  efforts	  in	  survival,	  not	  
revolution.	  Instead,	  as	  James	  Davies	  explained	  in	  1962,	  revolutions	  occur	  after	  a	  period	  of	  
sustained	  growth,	  in	  which	  “actual	  need	  satisfaction”	  matches	  “expected	  need	  satisfaction.”	  If	  
after	  such	  a	  period	  there	  is	  a	  sharp	  down-­‐turn	  in	  actual	  need	  satisfaction,	  while	  expected	  need	  
satisfaction	  remains	  high,	  an	  “intolerable	  gap”	  arises	  between	  what	  people	  want	  and	  what	  they	  
get.	  “Revolution	  occurs	  at	  this	  time.”29	  
	  
This	  “J	  curve”	  theory	  of	  revolutions	  has	  been	  tested	  many	  times	  since	  Davies	  and	  applied	  to	  
revolutions	  that	  happened	  long	  after	  him,	  such	  as	  the	  Iranian	  Revolution	  of	  1979	  and	  the	  “Arab	  
Spring”	  of	  2011.30	  If	  the	  theory	  holds,	  the	  US	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Western	  world	  may	  be	  ripe	  for	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revolution.	  The	  Great	  Recession	  followed	  a	  period	  of	  rapid	  growth	  and	  resulted	  in	  a	  wide	  gap	  
between	  actual	  and	  expected	  need	  satisfaction.	  The	  election	  of	  Donald	  Trump	  may	  be	  the	  
beginning	  of	  an	  attempt	  to	  remedy	  this	  gap,	  but	  given	  the	  policies	  actually	  proposed	  by	  the	  
GOP,	  is	  unlikely	  to	  close	  it.	  
	  
Scheidel	  would	  presumably	  acknowledge	  that	  wars	  and	  revolutions	  are	  generally	  not	  sought	  
out,	  even	  though	  they	  may	  reduce	  inequality.	  Nobody	  wanted	  World	  War	  I,	  but	  it	  still	  
happened.	  The	  current	  risk	  is	  that	  if	  nothing	  gets	  done,	  we	  may	  slip	  into	  a	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  
version	  of	  the	  deadly	  first	  half	  of	  the	  previous	  century.	  WWI	  and	  WWII	  occurred	  in	  part	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  a	  violent	  backlash	  against	  the	  first	  age	  of	  globalization,	  increased	  limitations	  on	  
immigration,	  and	  heightened	  tariff	  barriers.	  Current	  developments	  in	  the	  US	  and	  In	  Europe	  offer	  
disturbing	  parallels.	  
	  
What	  can	  be	  done	  to	  ameliorate	  inequality	  peacefully?	  Piketty	  and	  his	  colleagues	  propose	  two	  
major	  steps,	  both	  of	  which	  involve	  taxation:	  A	  sharp	  increase	  in	  the	  marginal	  tax	  rate	  on	  the	  rich	  
(up	  to	  over	  90%	  in	  some	  proposals),	  and	  a	  global	  tax	  on	  wealth.31	  
	  
These	  proposals	  seem	  unrealistic	  at	  present.	  The	  second	  requires	  an	  impossible	  level	  of	  global	  
cooperation	  (including	  every	  tax	  haven).32	  The	  first	  was	  tried	  before,	  but	  as	  the	  first	  author	  has	  
argued	  elsewhere,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  reduced	  inequality	  by	  much.	  While	  the	  era	  of	  very	  
high	  marginal	  tax	  rates	  (1936-­‐1981)	  coincided	  with	  the	  “great	  compression”	  and	  a	  reduction	  of	  
inequality,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  these	  two	  are	  in	  fact	  directly	  related.	  Historical	  evidence	  of	  effective	  tax	  
rates	  indicates	  that	  for	  most	  of	  the	  period	  1936-­‐1980,	  the	  actual	  effective	  tax	  rates	  paid	  by	  the	  
top	  1%	  were	  far	  below	  the	  nominal	  rates.33	  	  
	  
Moreover,	  the	  data	  for	  the	  subsequent	  period	  (1980-­‐2009)	  indicate	  that	  while	  the	  overall	  taxing	  
and	  spending	  of	  the	  Federal	  government	  had	  a	  significant	  downward	  effect	  on	  the	  Gini	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coefficient,	  reducing	  inequality	  by	  about	  20%	  on	  average,	  the	  top	  marginal	  tax	  rate	  on	  the	  1%	  
had	  very	  little	  to	  do	  with	  this	  trend.	  This	  is	  indicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  before	  and	  after-­‐tax	  
Ginis	  move	  in	  parallel	  throughout	  this	  period,	  despite	  large	  changes	  in	  the	  top	  statutory	  tax	  rate	  
(from	  70%	  down	  to	  28%	  and	  then	  back	  up	  to	  39.6%).	  The	  only	  tax	  that	  seems	  to	  have	  a	  
meaningful	  effect	  on	  the	  1%	  is	  the	  tax	  on	  dividends	  and	  capital	  gains,	  since	  there	  are	  data	  that	  
indicate	  that	  the	  ACA’s	  increase	  in	  the	  tax	  rate	  from	  20%	  to	  23.8%	  also	  increased	  the	  effective	  
tax	  rate	  of	  the	  top	  1%	  by	  the	  same	  amount.34	  This	  increase,	  however,	  is	  set	  to	  be	  abolished	  if	  the	  
GOP	  majority	  in	  Congress	  manages	  to	  repeal	  the	  ACA,	  and	  Speaker	  Ryan’s	  tax	  plan	  proposes	  a	  
further	  reduction	  to	  16.5%	  (the	  lowest	  rate	  on	  capital	  gains	  since	  1916).35	  	  
	  
If	  the	  top	  marginal	  tax	  rate	  is	  not	  an	  effective	  way	  of	  reducing	  inequality,	  what	  is?	  The	  data	  
suggest	  that	  the	  main	  driver	  of	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  Gini	  from	  the	  current	  taxing	  and	  spending	  of	  
the	  Federal	  government	  comes	  from	  the	  spending	  side,	  not	  from	  the	  tax	  side.	  In	  fact,	  it	  can	  be	  
shown	  that	  the	  fluctuations	  of	  the	  Gini	  in	  the	  period	  1980-­‐2009	  are	  directly	  correlated	  with	  
spending	  on	  the	  “entitlements”	  (Social	  Security,	  Medicaid	  and	  Medicare).36	  	  
	  
Thus,	  the	  most	  urgent	  way	  to	  address	  the	  inequality	  problem	  peacefully	  is	  to	  bolster	  the	  
entitlements.	  Given	  the	  retirement	  of	  the	  baby	  boom	  generation,	  more	  funding	  is	  needed	  for	  all	  
of	  them,	  including	  the	  ACA.	  The	  most	  obvious	  way	  of	  funding	  the	  entitlement	  is	  to	  adopt	  a	  
consumption	  tax	  (Value	  Added	  Tax,	  or	  VAT/Goods	  and	  Services	  Tax,	  or	  GST)	  at	  the	  Federal	  level	  
in	  addition	  to,	  and	  not	  as	  a	  replacement	  of,	  the	  current	  individual	  and	  corporate	  income	  taxes.	  	  
	  
Every	  other	  developed	  economy	  and	  most	  other	  countries	  (over	  100)	  finance	  their	  welfare	  state	  
primarily	  from	  a	  central	  consumption	  tax	  (VAT	  or	  GST).	  While	  these	  taxes	  are	  regressive,	  there	  
are	  ways	  to	  alleviate	  regressivity,	  including	  exempting	  necessary	  expenditures	  or	  providing	  
income-­‐based	  refunds.	  Moreover,	  these	  taxes	  are	  not	  regressive	  when	  the	  spending	  they	  are	  
used	  for	  is	  taken	  into	  account.37	  	  
	  
A	  broad-­‐based	  federal	  VAT	  in	  the	  US	  could	  raise	  $100	  billion	  for	  every	  percentage	  point	  of	  tax	  
per	  year.	  That	  means	  that	  a	  low	  5%	  VAT	  would	  be	  sufficient	  to	  raise	  $500	  billion	  each	  year,	  
enough	  to	  bolster	  Social	  Security,	  Medicare	  and	  Medicaid	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future,	  as	  well	  as	  
strengthening	  rather	  than	  repealing	  the	  ACA.38	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Another	  promising	  peaceful	  way	  of	  addressing	  inequality	  involves	  educational	  opportunity.	  The	  
current	  American	  way	  of	  funding	  education	  primarily	  through	  local	  property	  taxes	  is	  deeply	  
flawed	  and	  results	  in	  extreme	  disparities	  between	  poor	  and	  rich	  school	  districts	  (e.g.,	  in	  
Michigan	  the	  difference	  is	  over	  50%).39	  Funding	  education	  instead	  by	  a	  federal	  consumption	  tax,	  
as	  proposed	  by	  President	  Nixon	  in	  the	  1970s,	  could	  significantly	  enhance	  educational	  
opportunity	  and	  social	  mobility	  in	  poor	  school	  districts.	  Another	  5%	  of	  VAT	  could	  finance	  all	  K-­‐12	  
public	  education	  in	  the	  US,	  and	  a	  third	  5%	  could	  finance	  the	  much	  needed	  rebuilding	  of	  our	  
national	  infrastructure.40	  A	  total	  VAT	  of	  15%	  would	  be	  perfectly	  in	  line	  with	  rates	  in	  other	  
developed	  countries	  (15%	  is	  the	  minimum	  VAT	  rate	  in	  the	  EU,	  and	  many	  countries	  have	  a	  VAT	  of	  
over	  20%).	  
	  
A	  VAT	  is	  therefore	  the	  best	  way	  of	  addressing	  inequality	  peacefully.	  How	  likely	  is	  such	  a	  VAT	  in	  
the	  US?	  There	  are	  two	  possible	  scenarios:	  Presidential	  leadership	  and	  a	  crisis.41	  
	  
Under	  the	  first	  scenario,	  a	  second	  term	  President	  (since	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  any	  President	  will	  be	  
elected	  on	  a	  tax-­‐raising	  platform)	  proposes	  a	  VAT	  as	  part	  of	  an	  overall	  tax	  reform	  package.	  
Democrats	  will	  have	  to	  be	  convinced	  that	  a	  VAT	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  address	  inequality,	  and	  that	  
regressivity	  can	  be	  alleviated	  (e.g.,	  by	  payroll	  tax	  reductions).	  Republicans	  will	  have	  to	  be	  
convinced	  that	  a	  VAT	  is	  not	  just	  a	  money	  machine	  for	  growing	  government	  (e.g.,	  by	  making	  the	  
reform	  revenue	  neutral	  by	  abolishing	  the	  corporate	  tax).	  	  
	  
The	  famous	  VAT	  horror	  stories	  are	  the	  defeat	  of	  Ways	  and	  Means	  Chair	  Al	  Ulmann	  in	  1978	  after	  
proposing	  one,	  and	  the	  landslide	  defeat	  of	  Canadian	  Prime	  Minister	  Brian	  Mulroney	  after	  
passing	  one	  in	  1991.	  But	  Ulmann	  was	  defeated	  for	  other	  reasons,	  and	  Mulroney	  mishandled	  the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  VAT.	  In	  addition,	  Mulroney’s	  conservatives	  came	  back	  to	  power	  in	  Canada	  
and	  reduced	  the	  VAT	  rate	  (but	  did	  not	  eliminate	  it).	  A	  better	  example	  of	  political	  leadership	  is	  
Australia’s	  John	  Howard,	  who	  campaigned	  in	  1996	  under	  the	  promise	  of	  “never	  ever”	  to	  
introduce	  a	  VAT	  in	  Australia.	  Having	  won,	  Howard	  then	  proceeded	  to	  implement	  that	  VAT	  in	  
conjunction	  with	  both	  business	  and	  labor,	  and	  won	  re-­‐election	  twice	  by	  large	  margins.42	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A	  VAT	  is	  not	  more	  difficult	  to	  adopt	  than	  health	  care	  reform,	  or	  Social	  Security,	  Medicare	  and	  
Medicaid	  when	  they	  were	  first	  proposed,	  or	  civil	  rights	  legislation	  in	  1965.	  All	  it	  takes	  is	  an	  
experienced,	  politically	  astute	  president	  Like	  FDR	  or	  LBJ.43	  	  
	  
The	  other	  scenario	  is	  a	  fiscal	  crisis.	  This	  year,	  the	  US	  Treasury	  will	  sell	  bonds	  maturing	  in	  2047.	  
By	  then,	  the	  entitlements	  will	  consume	  the	  entire	  federal	  budget	  because	  of	  the	  aging	  of	  the	  
population,	  leaving	  no	  funds	  to	  pay	  interest.	  Presumably,	  foreign	  investors	  who	  buy	  US	  
Treasuries	  will	  balk	  and	  demand	  higher	  interest	  rates	  long	  before	  2047.	  Since	  it	  is	  politically	  
highly	  unlikely	  the	  entitlements	  can	  be	  cut	  or	  income	  tax	  rates	  raised	  sufficiently	  to	  fund	  the	  
burgeoning	  debt,	  at	  that	  point	  there	  will	  be	  a	  crisis	  similar	  to	  2008,	  but	  with	  no	  option	  other	  
than	  enacting	  the	  VAT.44	  
	  
Enacting	  the	  VAT	  is	  under	  current	  circumstances	  the	  last	  and	  best	  hope	  for	  reducing	  inequality	  
peacefully.	  Otherwise,	  as	  Scheidel	  convincingly	  argues,	  we	  may	  ultimately	  be	  faced	  with	  an	  
inevitable	  reduction	  in	  inequality	  by	  violent	  means—the	  same	  means	  that	  have	  reduced	  it	  
repeatedly	  throughout	  human	  history.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Reuven	  S.	  Avi-­‐Yonah,	  Designing	  a	  Federal	  VAT:	  Summary	  and	  Conclusions,	  63	  Tax	  Law	  Review	  285	  (2010);	  	  
44	  Leonard	  J.	  Burman,	  Jeffrey	  Rohaly,	  Joseph	  Rosenberg,	  and	  Katherine	  C.	  Lim,	  Catastrophic	  Budget	  Failure,	  63	  Nat’l	  
Tax	  J.	  561	  (2010);	  Rudolph	  G.	  Penner,	  Do	  We	  Need	  a	  VAT	  to	  Solve	  Our	  Long-­‐Run	  Budget	  Problems?	  63	  Tax	  Law	  
Review	  301	  (2010);	  Alan	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  Prospects	  for	  the	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